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Outsourcing firms increasingly rely on social auditors to provide strategic information about the conduct of 
their suppliers to manage the reputational risks that can arise from dangerous, illegal, and unethical 
behavior at supply chain factories. But little is known about what influences auditors’ ability to identify and 
report poor supplier conduct. We find evidence that private supply chain auditors’ reporting practices are 
shaped by several social factors including their experience, gender, and professional training; their ongoing 
relationships with suppliers; and the gender diversity of their audit teams. By providing the first 
comprehensive and systematic findings on supply chain auditing practices, our study suggests strategies 
companies can pursue to develop more credible monitoring regimes to reduce information asymmetries 
between themselves and their suppliers. 
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Reputation is a key strategic concern for modern firms (Roberts and Dowling, 2002) and 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance have become increasingly important 
dimensions of the firm’s reputation.  Poor ESG practices may make firms targets for activists, 
harming their reputations as well as their bottom lines (King and Soule, 2007; Vasi and King, 
2012), and firms are increasingly being held accountable by financial analysts and investors for 
their ESG performance (Ioannou, 2014).  Furthermore, firms that mislead stakeholders about 
their ESG performance through inaccurate disclosures may find their reputations tarnished 
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(Kayser, Maxwell, and Toffel, 2014). 
As firms continue to outsource much of their production globally, their reputations have 
come to depend not solely on their own practices but also on those of the companies in their 
extended supply chains (Heide, Kumar, and Wathne, 2014).  For instance, in the wake of the 
Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh that killed 1,100 factory workers, the bulk of media, 
consumer, and activist scrutiny focused on the global retailers that sourced from suppliers using 
the building (Greenhouse, 2013a).  Many of these global retailers were under such intense 
reputational pressure that they agreed to adopt a legally binding accord requiring them to spend 
hundreds of millions of dollars to fund fire-safety and structural improvements in the factories of 
their Bangladeshi suppliers (Greenhouse, 2013b).   
Largely because of the risk of negative reputational spillovers, supply chain conditions 
are listed as a top stakeholder concern in global indices (such as Innovest and the Global 
Reporting Initiative) and in recent strategy research (Crilly and Sloan, 2012).  Consumers, 
investors, and activists are increasingly holding firms accountable for the poor social practices of 
their suppliers (O’Callaghan, 2007) and research suggests that non-governmental organizations 
can impose substantial reputational penalties on firms whose suppliers violate global norms 
(Fung, O’Rourke, and Sabel, 2001; Vogel, 2010).  Reputational risk is particularly high for firms 
that have marketed their ethical sourcing practices to consumers if facts come to light that 
contradict these claims.  Studies show that firms risk being punished when stakeholders suspect 
them of “greenwashing” or “bluewashing” to mislead stakeholders by emphasizing positive 
attributes while neglecting to mention negative ones (Bowen, 2014; Ioannou, 2014; Kayser, 
Maxwell, and Toffel, 2014). 
To manage such risk, many firms require their suppliers to meet globally recognized 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469953 
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standards in areas including environmental sustainability, working conditions, and human rights.  
These requirements are typically imposed through code-of-conduct provisions in supply 
contracts or through voluntary certification schemes such as SA8000, Fairtrade, or the Forest 
Stewardship Council.  Suppliers’ adherence to these standards is often enforced through private 
social monitoring by supply chain auditors, also referred to as “social auditors” (Montiel, Husted, 
and Christmann, 2012). 
Social monitoring to manage supply chain risk has become a key governance mechanism 
providing firms with information with which to make strategic outsourcing decisions.  However, 
supply chain auditors have been criticized for failing to provide firms with complete and accurate 
information about the conditions in their supply chains (e.g., Esbenshade, 2004; Heras-
Saizarbitoria and Boiral, 2013; O’Rourke, 2002).  When auditors fail to accurately assess 
suppliers’ adherence to standards, they undermine firms’ ability to make fully informed 
outsourcing decisions and they subject firms to the risk of catastrophic reputational 
consequences.  For instance, in 2012, just weeks after social auditors certified that a factory in 
Pakistan met the SA8000 working conditions standard created by a respected nonprofit, a fire 
there killed hundreds of workers, some of whom were trapped by locked emergency exits and 
barred windows—clear violations of that standard (Walsh and Greenhouse, 2012).  
Despite the importance of supply chain auditors to firms’ reputation management, little is 
known about how they do their jobs. Much of the literature on private supply chain standards 
brackets the question of auditor performance or implicitly assumes that auditors provide 
reasonably objective assessments of on-the-ground conditions. To the extent that scholars 
address auditor performance, they have typically argued anecdotally that supply chain auditors 
are biased in favor of their paying clients (Esbenshade, 2004; Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral, 
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2013; O’Rourke, 2002). Recent qualitative research reveals that auditors often deny their 
vulnerability to conflicts of interest and socially construct a professional identity that emphasizes 
their independence (Dogui, Boiral, and Gendron, 2013). To our knowledge, however, no 
empirical research has rigorously investigated what factors shape supply chain auditors’ 
assessments of supplier adherence to standards.  
We seek to fill that gap.  Grounding our work in the strategic management literature and 
taking insights from the literatures on regulatory compliance and on financial auditing, we 
theorize and investigate individual and team characteristics that affect how social auditors do 
their job as they assess and record supply chain factories’ violations of private standards.  We 
argue that auditors are not merely objective transmitters of supply chain conditions but instead 
that social relationships, institutions, and individual identities shape the information they 
transmit to their corporate clients.   
We test our hypotheses in the context of social auditing for compliance with labor 
standards contained in corporate supplier codes of conduct. This form of private supply chain 
regulation has been adopted by thousands of prominent multinational corporations (MNCs), 
including all U.S. Fortune 500 companies (McBarnet, 2007). We exploit a novel dataset drawn 
from thousands of audits for code-of-conduct compliance in over 66 countries by one of the 
world’s largest supply chain auditing firms.  The results of our analysis indicate the complexity 
of the social auditing process. We find that auditors’ decisions are shaped by factors such as 
ongoing client relationships, professional experience, gender, and gender diversity. These 
findings significantly broaden the prevailing understanding of the supply chain auditing process 
and they suggest ways to design more effective monitoring regimes. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Decisions about outsourcing and the management of supply chains have become 
increasingly critical strategic concerns for firms (Alcacer and Oxley, 2014; Hult et al., 2007; 
Parmigiani, 2007; Reitzig and Wagner, 2010).  Current concerns go beyond the paradigmatic 
“make or buy” dilemma (Williamson, 1975) to raise complex strategic questions about which 
suppliers to buy from.  Choosing the correct supplier involves considering not only cost and 
quality, but also a variety of other concerns such as flexibility, reliability, and management 
attitude that can likewise affect firm performance.  On the one hand, there is growing evidence 
that choosing suppliers wisely can enhance a firm’s value by, for instance, improving its 
financial performance (Doig et al., 2001) or providing opportunities to develop knowledge 
(Alcacer and Oxley, 2014; Hult et al., 2004, 2007).  On the other hand, poor supplier choices can 
subject firms to serious costs, including remediation expenses, legal liability, and reputation 
damage (O’Callaghan, 2007).  
To reduce reputational risks and protect brand value, firms have invested significant 
resources to monitor their suppliers’ behavior (Blair et al., 2008).  As a condition of doing 
business, most multinational firms require their suppliers to meet globally recognized standards 
in areas including environmental sustainability, working conditions, and human rights 
(McBarnet, 2007) and many employ supply chain auditors to monitor suppliers’ adherence to 
these standards (Montiel, Husted, and Christmann, 2012).  The transaction cost economics (TCE) 
literature has long posited that monitoring is a key mechanism for reducing transaction costs that 
arise when contractual partners opportunistically exploit information asymmetries (Eisenhardt, 
1985; Heide, Kumar, and Wathne, 2014).  “[M]onitoring offers control by reducing information 
asymmetry between exchange parties” (Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan, 2007: 426).  Specifically, 
 6
the information gathered by monitors provides firms “with strategically valuable knowledge 
about how [their exchange partners] operate and the perception of their operations among 
stakeholders” (Park, 2014: 28).  Ideally, such information should give a firm an accurate picture 
of the risks and benefits posed by different suppliers, allowing it to make crucial strategic 
decisions about which suppliers to work with and where. 
While the TCE literature highlights the important governance function of monitoring, it 
contains little empirical research on monitoring and has not conceptualized the distinct role and 
contours of monitoring in global supply chains.  First, the TCE literature has focused on “ex ante 
safeguards to deter ex post opportunism” (Williamson, 2008), including contractual provisions 
(Argyres, Bercovitz, and Mayer, 2007; Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006; Kalnins and Mayer, 2004), 
technological capabilities (Mayer and Salomon, 2006), and shared knowledge base (Garicano 
and Hubbard, 2009; Heide, Kumar, and Wathne, 2014; Puranam et al., 2013).  This focus has 
obscured the importance of ongoing, ex post monitoring to contain the costs of negative 
reputational spillovers from contractual partners’ poor social practices.  
Second, the TCE literature has not appreciated the fact that the monitoring of outsourced 
production in supply chains is, itself, often outsourced to third-party auditors.  Although some 
firms have extensive in-house monitoring programs, most rely on private social auditors, 
certification organizations, or other independent assurance services to monitor their suppliers and 
provide them with strategic information about exchange partners’ activities.  Outsourcing of the 
firm’s traditional monitoring function has created second-order agency problems associated with 
monitoring the monitors.  These problems have not been adequately addressed in scholarship or 
in practice.  Firms tend to assume that the information they receive from the monitors they retain 
accurately reflects conditions on the ground in their supply chains, but critics have suggested that 
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this is not always the case (e.g., Esbenshade, 2004; Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral, 2013; 
O’Rourke, 2002; Pierce and Toffel, 2013).  To date, however, neither TCE research nor research 
on supply chain auditing has provided guidance on how to enhance the reliability of the 
information firms receive about their suppliers through monitoring.   
There is a substantial literature on the implementation of private standards governing 
supply chain practices, including  how these standards are developed (Meidinger, 2002; Wood, 
2004), why they are adopted  (Bartley, 2007, 2010; Boiral, 2007; Christmann and Taylor, 2001, 
2006; Delmas, 2002; Delmas and Montiel, 2008; Delmas and Toffel, 2008; Guler, Guillén, and 
MacPherson, 2002; Hoffman, 2001; King, Lenox, and Terlaak, 2005; Potoski and Prakash, 2004; 
Prakash and Potoski, 2006; Terlaak and King, 2006), and their financial, operational, and 
compliance outcomes (Corbett, Montes-Sancho, and Kirsch, 2005; Delmas, 2001; Esbenshade, 
2004; King and Lenox, 2001; Kocer and Fransen, 2009; Levine and Toffel, 2010; Locke, Rising, 
and Pal, 2012; Locke and Romis, 2007; Potoski and Prakash, 2005a, 2005b; Rodríguez-Garavito, 
2005; Short and Toffel, 2010; Terlaak and King, 2006; Toffel and Short, 2011; Yin and 
Schmeidler, 2009). However, while the literature examining supply chain standards assigns 
private auditors a leading role, it provides little insight into how they play it (Heras-Saizarbitoria 
and Boiral, 2013).   
In fact, most research on supply chain standards assumes that private auditors hired to 
monitor supplier compliance document and report violations in a way that is reasonably 
objective and that depends principally on the scope and content of the standards contained in the 
audit protocol.  Such assumptions, however, are contrary to studies of public regulatory 
implementation documenting significant heterogeneity in the way government monitors apply 
the rules they are charged with enforcing (Black, 1997; Feinstein, 1989, 1990; Hawkins, 1984; 
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Lemley and Sampat, 2012; Macher, Mayo, and Nickerson, 2011) and to experimental studies in 
the social psychology literature documenting the influence of cognitive biases on the 
performance of financial auditors (e.g., Asare, Trompeter, and Wright, 2000; Glover, 1997; 
Hoffman and Patton, 1997; Tetlock, 1983; Turner, 2001).   
Some empirical studies have investigated influences on the performance of private-sector 
auditors, but have focused almost exclusively on economic conflicts of interest.  Studies have 
demonstrated, for instance, that auditors are more lax when they monitor their own paying clients 
(Duflo, Greenstone, Pande, and Ryan, 2013; Jiang, Stanford, and Xie, 2012; Kinney, Jr., 
Palmrose, and Scholz, 2004), when they face more competition (Bennett et al., 2013), and when 
they operate in corrupt institutional environments in which they are more likely to receive side 
payments from audited firms (Montiel et al., 2012).   
While these studies identify important criteria affecting the quality of information 
generated through audits, we seek to move beyond economic incentives to investigate the 
influence of social institutions and relationships.  Such influence is well established in the 
literature on public regulatory enforcement (Brehm and Gates, 1997; Keiser and Soss, 1998; 
Lipsky, 1980/2010; May and Winter, 2000; Maynard-Moody and Musheno, 2003; Piore, 2005; 
Piore and Schrank, 2008; Sandfort, 2000; Schrank, 2009), but has not been explored in the 
context of private monitoring.  This is a significant gap in the literature, particularly as private 
third-party auditors become increasingly central both to effectuating global firms’ risk 
management strategies and to enforcing domestic and transnational regulatory regimes.  The 
assumption in the literature has been that the profit motive is the dominant, if not exclusive, 
influence driving private monitors (Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein, 1997; Cantor and 
Packer, 1994; Dallas, 2011; Moore et al., 2006; Manns, 2013; Oh, 2004; Partnoy, 2006).  While 
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we recognize that private auditors are subject to very different incentive structures than 
government inspectors, we resist the premise that economic incentives will entirely crowd out 
social influences, and we draw on the literature on regulatory compliance to theorize how social 
as well as economic factors will influence private auditors’ decisions.  These insights are crucial 
to understanding how firms can manage their monitors and maximize the validity of the strategic 
information they receive from their auditors about their suppliers. 
HYPOTHESES  
Ongoing auditor-supplier relationships 
Many have theorized that auditors who repeatedly visit an audited entity are likely to be 
subject to cognitive biases and social pressures that will influence which violations they detect 
and cite.  Bounded rationality limits the number of issues an auditor can pursue during any given 
audit (Jones, 2001; Simon, 1947). As Chugh and Bazerman (2007: 3) have argued, “bounded 
awareness” causes individuals to “overfocus on some information and fail to use other easily 
available information.” Specifically, individuals tend to focus on information that comports with 
the tacit knowledge they have gained through experience. Though tacit knowledge can be a 
useful resource for decision makers, “dependence on tacit knowledge can create bounds on their 
awareness” (Kumar and Chakrabarti, 2012: 940).  
These cognitive biases may be reinforced by social pressures.  Returning auditors may 
develop “cozy relationships” (Moore et al., 2006: 24) with an audited firm’s management that 
leads them to identify with its positions.  Familiarity between auditors and management may also 
foster corruption, emboldening managers to pressure auditors to report good results. 
Empirical research has documented how managers’ awareness is bounded by their past 
experiences.  Specifically, “managers use already established knowledge to determine what they 
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see, and they use what they already know to choose what to look for in their environment” (von 
Krogh, Roos, and Slocum, 1994: 58) and their “perceptual and cognitive limitations” have been 
shown to lead to errors (Huber and Power, 1985: 172). Henderson and Clark (1990) similarly 
demonstrate that professional engineers who advise management tend to approach new problems 
through the lens of their experience solving previous problems, restricting their ability to identify 
innovative solutions.  Empirical research on government inspectors has found that ongoing 
relationships between inspectors and inspected entities encourage a “benefit of the doubt” style 
of enforcement rather than an arms-length “policing” style (Bardach and Kagan, 1982/2002) and 
result in less severe penalties (Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Cohen, 2013). 
Our interviews with social auditors revealed similar concerns that an auditor who keeps 
auditing the same facility may “go native,” becoming an extension of the supplier’s 
management. In addition, we have no reason to believe that private auditors will not be subject to 
the same bounded awareness constraints as other monitors. Returning to the same supplier, they 
are likely to focus on the domains they highlighted previously, whereas a completely new audit 
team would examine a supplier with a fresh set of eyes and focus on a different set of issues, 
likely uncovering new violations.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): An audit will yield fewer violations when conducted by an audit team 
that includes a member of the supplier’s previous audit team.  
Auditor tenure 
Scholars and activists have suggested that more experienced supply chain auditors are 
more effective (Esbenshade, 2004; Locke, Qin, and Brause, 2007). It is not clear, however, how 
experience affects the number of violations cited in a given audit. On the one hand, experience 
enhances the ability to identify violations, as would be expected and as has been documented in 
qualitative studies of government inspectors (Bardach and Kagan, 1982/2002). Our interviews 
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with managers of social auditors also indicate that experience acquaints auditors with “tricks of 
the trade”—such as how to detect that a supplier uses child labor even if child workers are not 
present during the audit—and that auditors exhibit “massive improvement” in their initial years 
on the job, although such marginal gains later diminish. 
On the other hand, it is not clear that more experienced auditors will cite more violations. 
Scholarship on government regulatory agencies has suggested that new inspectors tend to exhibit 
“a more policing, nit-picking attitude” than more seasoned inspectors (Bardach and Kagan, 2002: 
129). Inexperienced inspectors “know too little about the industries and operations they are 
inspecting” and thus “lack the confidence to evaluate actual levels of risk” posed by particular 
violations, so they tend to go by the book and cite everything (Bardach and Kagan, 1982/2002: 
129). Experienced inspectors, by contrast, may decline to cite violations lacking the requisite 
level of risk and culpability (Bardach and Kagan, 1982/2002; Hawkins, 1984). We therefore 
expect that violation counts will initially rise with auditor tenure, as auditors gain the experience 
to detect violations, but that this effect will be tempered as experienced auditors gain the 
confidence to exercise more discretion about which violations to cite.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Audits conducted by more experienced auditor teams will yield more 
violations but at a decreasing rate. 
Professionalization 
Education and training should promote both detection and citation of violations (Chen, 
Chang, and Lee, 2008). More professionalized auditors may feel more obligated to cite what they 
find. Sociologists have long theorized that professionalization—specialized education and 
training in a field’s skills and values—is a key constraint on individual discretion in both 
corporate and government bureaucracies (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1994; Larson, 1977; Scott, 
1966). Weber (1947) argued that professionals are governed by a shared commitment to the 
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ethics and purposes of their profession, which can motivate them to act independently of 
hierarchical commands; Durkheim (1893/1984) suggested that the professions help sustain 
community by preserving and transmitting shared values.  
More recently, Lipsky (1980/2010: 201) argued that enhanced professionalism constrains 
the discretion of front-line workers in government bureaucracies: “[S]treet-level bureaucrats 
should be professionals whose relatively altruistic behavior, high standards, and self-monitoring 
substitute for what the society cannot dictate. Who will watch the watchmen? The watchmen will 
watch themselves.” Scholars have also suggested that professionalism can temper the influence 
of economic incentives on employees of for-profit corporations. For instance, Parker (1999) 
argues that if the staff of a corporate internal compliance program were more professionalized, it 
might be better equipped to contest the company’s profit-maximization imperatives in order to 
discourage wrongdoing. Although many have noted the gap between professionals’ value-
orientation in theory and their profit-orientation in practice (Gordon and Simon, 1992; Lipsky, 
1980/2010; Thompson, 1967), professionalism remains one of the few mechanisms available to 
create “islands of civic virtue … in a world of generalized self-seeking” (Gordon and Simon, 
1992: 235). Research has demonstrated that professionalization improved the efficacy of 
government labor inspectors (Piore, 2005; Schrank, 2009). We therefore expect that teams whose 
auditors are more professionalized will record more violations. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Audits conducted by teams that include auditors who are more 
professionalized will yield more violations.  
Gender 
Research has suggested that, even when constrained by bureaucratic rules and roles, men 
and women may perform their work “somewhat differently” (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmindt, 
2001: 783). Several gender-based behavioral distinctions documented in the literature can 
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influence whether social auditors discover—and then, whether they cite—violations. Research 
has shown that women are more persistent at pursuing assigned tasks (Jacob, 2002; Spence and 
Buckner, 2000; Stonewater, Eveslage, and Dingerson, 1990), suggesting more diligent 
enforcement of regulations. Research has also found that women have perceptual and integrative 
processing advantages that may enhance their ability to detect violations. For example, women 
have been found to be more skilled at interpreting the emotional content of others’ expressions 
(Campanella et al., 2004; Killgore and Cupp, 2002; Thayer and Johnsen, 2000) and to be “more 
sensitive to subtle stimulus” (Darley and Smith, 1995: 43). Research has also found that women 
tend to use a more comprehensive information-processing style, whereby they “attempt to 
assimilate all available cues” (Darley and Smith, 1995: 43). According to Gold, Hunton, and 
Gomaa (2009: 3): 
[W]omen tend to integrate more of the available evidential cues into their judgments, 
reflecting an intense level of cognitive processing. Men, on the other hand, tend to 
eliminate what they deem to be irrelevant cues and focus on a limited set of salient pieces 
of information that are relatively easy and quick to process.  
 
Thus, women’s information-gathering and processing style may better equip them to perceive 
violations in a complex factory setting and to elicit information about violations from employees. 
Moreover, research suggests that women are more likely to cite the violations they 
perceive. Women in bureaucratic organizations are more likely than men to be strict rule-
followers (Oberfield, 2010; Portillo, 2012; Portillo and DeHart-Davis, 2009). A long line of 
sociological scholarship has argued generally that “rules are a means of asserting power for the 
less powerful” (Portillo, 2012: 91) and that low-status members of organizations use rules as a 
source of authority to compensate for their lack of personal authority (Green and Melnick, 1950; 
Kanter, 1977; Thompson, 1977). We are not aware of any research on women’s status in supply 
chain auditing, but research on financial auditors and audit firms suggests that, even as many 
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women have entered that profession, audit firms have maintained masculine organizational 
cultures that tend to devalue women’s contributions (Haynes, 2012; Jonnergård, Stafsudd, and 
Elg, 2010; Mueller, Carter, and Ross-Smith, 2011). Our interviews with social auditors suggest 
that, especially in societies with more rigid gender hierarchies, supplier managers view male 
auditors as more authoritative. Empirical studies of government workers have found that women 
do indeed “go by the book” (Green and Melnick, 1950; Portillo, 2012: 90; Portillo and DeHart-
Davis, 2009) more strictly than their male colleagues do. All this evidence suggests that gender 
will significantly influence whether supply chain auditors detect and cite violations. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Audits conducted by all-female teams will yield more violations than 
those conducted by all-male teams. 
Gender diversity 
Supply chain auditing teams are not necessarily all-male or all-female. In the 
organizational literature on teams, there is significant debate about the effects of diversity, 
including gender diversity, on team performance (Joshi and Roh, 2009; Phillips et al., 2012). We 
expect that gender diversity will enhance a supply chain auditing team’s performance because of 
complementary perceptual styles and interpersonal dynamics.  
First, women’s and men’s different perceptual styles may cause them to identify different 
types of violation, enabling mixed-gender teams to find more. This should be particularly 
valuable in eliciting information from a diverse set of supply chain employees and managers. 
Research has demonstrated that, for a variety of reasons, “diversity in groups increases the 
likelihood that there will be access to different information in a group” (Phillips et al., 2012: 
161). Our interviews with social auditors indicate that factories subjected to social audits tend to 
have predominantly female workers and male managers and that the female workers are more 
likely to communicate openly with female auditors, while, as one interviewee put it, male 
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supplier managers, “for cultural reasons, may find it difficult…to open up to women.”  
Second, research has shown how the interpersonal dynamics of gender diversity can 
improve team performance. For instance, studies find that people on socially diverse teams tend 
to prepare more thoroughly and to think through a broader range of issues (Loyd et al., 2013). 
Fenwick and Neal report the superior performance of gender-diverse teams at management-
simulation exercises, crediting it to the “mix of male and female operating, decision-making and 
leadership styles” (2001: 217). Furthermore, men on mixed teams may try harder if they see they 
are being outperformed by women. Studies have shown that lower-performing team members 
often compare themselves to better performers, which tends to raise their “usual performance 
levels in order to match or beat the stronger performers” (Collins, 2000; Lount, Jr. and Phillips, 
2007; Weber, Wittchen, and Hertel, 2009: 732). Weber, Wittchen, and Hertel (2009) demonstrate 
that men are particularly prone to such competitive behavior. Male auditors may therefore feel 
compelled to match or exceed their female teammates’ citation rates.  
Although some conflicting evidence suggests that gender diversity can sometimes 
undermine team performance, a recent meta-study found that gender diversity is particularly 
likely to enhance performance in service industries, where team members interact directly with 
clients (Joshi and Roh, 2009). Because supply chain auditing is a service industry and auditors 
interact a lot with the individuals they audit, we expect that gender diversity will improve team 
performance. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Audits conducted by gender-diverse teams will yield more violations 
than those conducted by single-gender teams.  
 
DATA AND MEASURES  
Empirical context and sample  
To test our hypotheses, we obtained data for thousands of code-of-conduct audits 
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conducted in 66 countries between 2004 and 2009 by one of the world’s largest social auditing 
companies.1 During that period, the company, which already had more than a decade’s 
experience, employed several hundred people in many countries; they spoke over 30 languages.  
The dataset contains audit results for and information about each audited supplier, 
including its country and a unique identifier; characteristics and unique identifiers for the 
auditors on each audit; and the country of the multinational firm on whose behalf each audit was 
conducted and a unique identifier for that firm. The auditor preserved the anonymity of the 
factories, auditors, and multinational firms by not revealing their names. Our estimations are 
based on the 16,795 audits of 5,819 factories (in 66 countries) for which we had data on all the 
measures described below and which had been audited at least twice during the sample period (a 
technical requirement owing to our models being estimated with supplier-level fixed effects, 
described below). The country and industry composition of our sample is reported in Tables 1 
and 2; the most common industries are garments, accessories, electronics, and toys.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
In nearly all cases, multinational firms determined (a) which suppliers would be audited 
and (b) whether the multinational firm or the supplier (or its agents) would pay. Our interviews 
indicated that this decision was not driven by the supplier’s managerial attitude, violation rate, or 
improvement rate. (Factories sometimes sought and paid for audits when they sought to become 
certified to a third-party standard such as SA8000. As described later, our results are robust to 
omitting from the estimation sample the very small proportion of audits that used third-party 
protocols.)  
                                                 
1 The company required anonymity as a condition of sharing its data with us. 
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Dependent variable 
We measure the extent to which factories adhere to codes of conduct as the number of 
violations in each audit,2 obtained from the social auditing firm’s database. We include only the 
types of violation that, according to the social auditing firm (hereafter referred to as “the auditing 
firm”), apply in all industries and are interpreted by auditors in the same way in all countries; 
namely, violations of rules for child labor, forced or compulsory labor, working hours, 
occupational health and safety, minimum wage, treatment of foreign workers and subcontractors, 
and disciplinary practices.3 During an audit, the auditors code a common set of dichotomous 
indicators (violation or no violation) in each category.4  
Independent variables  
To identify the potential for auditors’ career concerns to influence their behavior, we 
coded previous auditor as 1 when at least one member of the focal audit team had participated in 
one of the supplier’s previous audits during the sample period and 0 otherwise.  
We measure an auditor’s experience as his or her years of service at the auditing firm 
based on data from the auditing firm’s database. We calculated maximum tenure as the highest 
number of years that any member of the audit team had worked at the company. (Using average 
tenure rather than the maximum tenure yielded nearly identical results.)  
We measure the professionalism of the audit team in two ways. Because one important 
                                                 
2 Studies of compliance with government health and safety regulations have long used violation counts recorded by 
inspectors as a measure of compliance variation (Braithwaite and Makkai, 1991; Gray and Scholz, 1993; Gray and 
Shadbegian, 2005) and more recent studies of supplier compliance with private labor standards have used violation 
data recorded by private auditors (Ang et al., 2012; Oka, 2010). 
3 We exclude other categories that, according to our auditor interviews, applied only to factories in particular 
industries or that were interpreted differently in different countries: the right of association, the right to organize and 
bargain collectively, legal client regulation, dormitory conditions, and canteen violations.  
4 The occupational health and safety category, for example, consists of seven indicators pertinent to emergency 
preparedness (blocked or locked aisles or exits, inadequate first-aid supplies, insufficient emergency exits, lack of 
emergency lighting, lack of employee emergency training, lack of an evacuation plan, and unmarked aisles), five 
indicators of fire safety, eight related to toilets, and eight related to the work floor. 
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source of professionalization is “standardized formal training in universities” (Lipsky, 
1980/2010: 201), we code graduate education as 1 when at least one member of the audit team 
had a graduate degree and 0 otherwise. We focused on graduate education because nearly all 
auditors in our dataset had a bachelor’s degree.5 We also created auditing skills training as the 
highest number of the auditing firm’s training courses that any audit team member had 
completed. These courses teach skills such as how to interpret national labor laws and how to 
detect payroll manipulation that might indicate wage violations. (Using the average rather than 
the maximum number of training courses yielded nearly identical results.)  
We measure gender composition with three dummy variables—all-female audit team, 
all-male audit team, and mixed-gender audit team.6  
Control variables 
Training can influence the stringency of government regulators (Macher, Mayo, and 
Nickerson, 2011). We therefore control for two types of training that might influence either an 
audit team’s ability to detect and report violations or the nature of the violations it detects and 
reports. Using the auditing firm’s database, we calculated the proportion of each team that had 
undergone certification training—training on the standards and protocols of a particular 
certification regime, such as SA8000—because the firm indicated that such training influences 
the scope of the audit and the types of violation auditors look for.  We also calculated the 
proportion of each team that had undergone brand training—training provided by the 
multinational firm on its corporate responsibility program and procedures—to account for 
                                                 
5 We coded graduate education as a dichotomous variable rather than a continuous measure to better reflect the near-
binary distribution in our sample: 87 percent of the audit teams had no members with a master’s degree, 7 percent 
had all members with a master’s degree, and a mere 6 percent had an intermediate configuration. 
6 We use these dummies rather than a continuous measure such as proportion female because the database indicated 
that 97 percent of the audit teams in our sample were all-female, all-male, or evenly divided. Thus, the three 
dummies represent the distribution of our data. 
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possible variations in stringency requested by different brands.  
We control for auditors’ age to ensure that the effects of auditor tenure can be attributed 
to job experience rather than to the life-cycle effects posited by human capital theory (Diamond, 
Jr., 1984), which predicts “an inverse U-shaped relationship between productivity and age” 
(Teitelbaum, 2006: 166). Because the auditing firm provided only five-year age-range categories 
(for example, 20–24 years old) for each auditor to keep precise ages confidential, we created a 
proxy for the team’s average age. We calculated the midpoint for each category and then created 
average age as the average of the oldest and youngest age-range categories on a team. (Using the 
oldest team member’s age rather than the average yielded nearly identical results.) 
We created a dummy variable to indicate whether an audit used a third-party protocol—
such as that of the Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI), the Initiative Clause Sociale 
(ICS), the Sedex Members Ethical Trade Audit (SMETA), the International Council of Toy 
Industries (ICTI), or Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP)—because such 
protocols might limit an auditor’s discretion.  
We also control for whether an audit is unannounced or pre-announced, using a dummy 
variable, unannounced audit, coded 1 for an unannounced audit and 0 for a pre-announced audit. 
The latter provides several weeks of notice, giving the supplier time to try to remedy problems, 
which could result in fewer violations to find.  
Because research has indicated that financial conflicts of interest created by audit fees 
undermine auditors’ and inspectors’ stringency in policing corporate misconduct (Bazerman, 
Morgan, and Loewenstein, 1997; Cantor and Packer, 1994; Dallas, 2011; Duflo et al., 2013; 
Estlund, 2012; Manns, 2013; Moore et al., 2006; Oh, 2004; Partnoy, 2006; Pierce and Toffel, 
2013), we control for which entity paid for each audit. Using the auditing firm’s database, we 
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created two dichotomous variables. Audit paid for by supplier or agent identifies audits with the 
potential for financial conflict of interest. It is coded 1 for audits paid for by the audited supplier 
or by agents, vendors, or licensees and coded 0 for audits paid for by the multinational firm.7 
Audit paid for by the multinational firm is coded in the opposite manner.  
We include dummy variables to control for the number of auditors on each audit (two 
through five, with one as the omitted category). Audit team size is a direct function of supplier 
size and complexity in our setting, but others have shown that larger teams of government 
inspectors can lead to more stringent monitoring (Muehlenbachs, Staubli, and Cohen, 2013).  
We created a dummy variable re-audit to distinguish routine audits from re-audits, which 
tend to focus on domains where violations were previously identified and which therefore tend to 
yield fewer violations than routine audits. We also include a series of dummies to indicate a 
supplier’s audit sequence—its second audit, third audit, and so on through sixth-or-higher audit 
(because only five percent of the audits in our sample were a supplier’s seventh or higher audit), 
with a supplier’s first audit as the omitted category—to control for the possibility that successive 
audits yield fewer violations as factories address the issues exposed. (Using an audit sequence 
counter variable and its square rather than the dummies yielded nearly identical results.)  
To capture domestic institutional factors that could influence a supplier’s compliance 
with codes of conduct (Toffel, Short, and Ouellet, 2014), we control for several country-level 
governmental, economic, and civil-society attributes. We measure the average economic 
development level of a supplier’s country in the year the audit was conducted as its annual per-
                                                 
7 We combined these categories of payer because prior research and our auditor interviews suggest that, in our 
empirical context, the financial incentives of factories and these intermediaries are closely aligned. In developing 
economies, intermediaries’ role is to promote exports by domestic manufacturers by identifying new markets for 
their goods and services (Ellis, 2011) and by reducing transaction-cost barriers to export (Ahn, Khandelwal, and 
Shang-Jin, 2011). Our results are robust to an alternative specification in which we include two dummies that 
control for audits paid for by factories as distinct from audits paid for by agents, vendors, or licensees. 
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capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 2005 dollars, calculated by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s Economic Research Service (obtained from http://www.ers.usda.gov). To reduce 
skew, we use the log. To measure the extent to which the government of the supplier’s country 
fosters a regulatory environment promoting economic development, we use the annual 
regulatory quality metric corresponding to the year the audit was conducted. This metric is 
calculated by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators project (obtained from 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators) to capture “perceptions 
of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development” (World Bank, 2013).8  
We measure the extent of press freedom in the supplier’s country the year the audit took 
place via the annual Press Freedom Index produced by Reporters without Borders (obtained from 
http://en.rsf.org). This index incorporates the extent to which journalists face direct and indirect 
threats—including imprisonment, physical attacks, censorship, and self-censorship—and the 
number of journalists detained, murdered, physically attacked, or threatened. We create annual 
press freedom by reverse-coding the Press Freedom Index, so that a higher score represents more 
press freedom, and then rescaling the result to range from 0 to 1. 
Summary statistics and correlations are reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
Our empirical model includes all independent and control variables described above and 
three sets of fixed effects. Specifically, we estimate the following model: 
                                                 
8 Controlling instead for supplier countries’ annual Corruption Perceptions Index scores from Transparency 
International, which are highly correlated with the World Bank’s regulatory quality metric (=0.96), yields nearly 
identical results. 
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Yicdj = F ( β1 Xid + β2  id + β3 cd + β4 i + β5 t + β6 j + εicdj), 
where Yicdj refers to the number of violations recorded in the audit of supplier i in country c that 
was conducted on date d on behalf of a multinational firm in country j. F (·) refers to the Poisson 
function. Xid refers to our hypothesized variables (previous auditor, maximum tenure, average 
tenure, graduate education, auditing skills training, all-male audit team, all-female audit team, 
mixed-gender audit team). id refers to the audit-level control variables described above 
(certification training, brand training, average age, maximum age, third-party protocol, 
unannounced audit, audit paid for by supplier or agent, audit paid for by multinational firm, re-
audit, fixed effects denoting number of auditors [two through five-or-more], and fixed effects 
indicating the supplier’s audit sequence [second through sixth-or-more]). cd  refers to the annual 
supplier-country control variables described above (per-capita GDP (log), regulatory quality, 
press freedom). We include fixed effects for each supplier (i) to control for time-invariant 
characteristics that might affect that factory’s violation rate, such as size, age, industry, and 
national institutional context.9 A series of dummies for the year in which the audit was conducted 
(t) controls for overall temporal trends. We also include fixed effects for the headquarters 
country of the multinational firm on whose behalf each audit was conducted (j). This controls 
for the possibility that consumers and activist groups in different multinational firm countries 
vary in their concern for and attentiveness to supply chain conditions, which might in turn affect 
how much pressure firms exert on their supply chain auditors to audit stringently. These fixed 
effects also control for all other time-invariant differences between the multinational firm 
headquarters countries’ institutional contexts.  
                                                 
9 Because supplier-level fixed effects in our model absorb the time-invariant portion of supplier-country-level 
variables, per-capita GDP, regulatory quality, and press freedom effectively control for within-country temporal 
variation in their effect on supplier violation rates. 
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Our identification strategy is based on the fact that the process of assigning auditors to 
audit teams is unrelated to our independent variables and thus is not a source of endogeneity that 
should bias their coefficients. Specifically, our interviews with the social auditing firm indicated 
that assignments were based on (1) language skills to communicate with management and 
workers, (2) availability, and (3) the need for at least one team member to qualify as a lead 
auditor. Potential concerns that endogenous audit assignment—and, in particular, differences 
between lead auditors and other auditors—might bias our results led us to conduct several 
supplemental analyses. As described in detail in the Appendix, our comparison of lead and non-
lead auditors’ demographic characteristics (such as languages spoken, age, experience, and 
training) and estimation of instrumental variable regressions yielded no evidence indicating 
endogeneity bias. 
Results 
We estimate the model using Poisson regression with robust standard errors and report 
our results in Column 1 of Table 5. Negative-binomial regression with conditional fixed effects 
yields nearly identical results, indicating that our results are not sensitive to estimation technique. 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) were below 2 for all hypothesized variables and below 5 for all 
variables except a few buyer-country dummies, which yields no evidence that multicollinearity is 
a serious concern. The explanatory power of the model is indicated by a McFadden’s R-squared 
value of 0.39 and a McFadden’s adjusted R-squared value of 0.30. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The significant negative coefficient on previous auditor (= -0.04; p = 0.03; IRR = 0.96) 
indicates that audits yield 4 percent fewer violations when a team member had participated in a 
prior audit at the same supplier, which supports Hypothesis 1. The average marginal effect 
 24
(AME) of -0.3 indicates that, compared to the sample average of 6.5 violations, an audit by a 
team with a previous auditor would yield 6.2 violations. 
The audit team’s maximum tenure has a significant positive coefficient ( = 0.07; p < 
0.01) and its square term has a significant negative coefficient ( = -0.004; p < 0.01), implying 
that the number of violations cited increases as tenure increases but at a diminishing rate, which 
supports Hypothesis 2. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1, which graphs average 
predicted violations at varying levels of the audit team’s maximum experience.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Our results are mixed with respect to professionalization. The coefficient on graduate 
education is positive as predicted but not significant, yielding no evidence that audits conducted 
by audit teams with more formal education yielded significantly more violations. Audits did 
yield significantly more violations when conducted by more professionalized auditors as 
measured by auditor training ( = 0.02; p < 0.01; IRR = 1.02). This result is not driven by age or 
tenure because we control for these factors. The average marginal effect indicates that each 
additional training course (pursued by the most highly trained member of the team) is associated 
with an additional 0.14 violations. In other words, an audit team whose most highly trained 
member had taken nine training courses would, on average, cite one more violation than a team 
whose most highly trained member had taken two training courses. Jointly, these results yield 
some support for Hypothesis 3, but only when professionalization is measured by specific 
training rather than by broader education. 
Team gender composition is also significantly associated with the number of violations 
reported. Audits by all-female teams yield 6 percent more violations than those by all-male 
teams (the baseline) ( = 0.05; p < 0.01; IRR = 1.05), which supports Hypothesis 4. The average 
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marginal effect indicates that audits by all-female teams yield 0.35 more violations than those by 
all-male teams (the baseline category).  
Mixed-gender teams yield on average 7 percent more violations—or nearly half a 
violation more—than all-male teams (the baseline) ( = 0.07; p < 0.01; IRR = 1.07) and slightly 
more violations than all-female teams (AME = 0.1), but the latter difference is not statistically 
distinguishable (2 = 0.55; p = 0.46). These results partially support Hypothesis 5.  
The coefficients on second inspection through sixth or more inspection are negative and 
statistically significant. Wald tests comparing these coefficients indicate that, on average, each 
successive audit yields significantly fewer violations. Average marginal effects indicate that, on 
average, a supplier’s second audit yields nearly one fewer violation than its initial audit during 
our sample period (= -0.15; p < 0.01; AME = -0.9), its third audit yields nearly 1.3 fewer than 
its second audit (AME = -2.2, a statistically significant decline: Wald 2 = 114; p < 0.01), and its 
fourth audit yields 0.6 fewer than its third audit (AME = -2.8, a statistically significant decline: 
Wald 2 = 20; p < 0.01). This relationship is also apparent in the summary statistics depicted in 
Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Consistent with assigning more auditors to larger factories, which are likely to generate 
more violations, we find that audits with more auditors yield significantly more violations. We 
find no evidence that the number of violations varied with the team’s certification training, brand 
training, or average age or with a third-party protocol. Our point estimate indicates that 
unannounced audits yielded slightly more violations than announced audits at a given supplier 
(AME = 0.2), but the difference was outside conventional significance levels (p = 0.15). 
Audits paid for by factories or agents yielded 8 percent fewer violations than audits paid 
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for by the multinational firm, the baseline category (= -0.08; p < 0.01; IRR = 0.92). The 
average marginal effect indicates that, on average, audits yield 0.6 fewer violations when the 
supplier or agent pays than when the multinational firm pays, a drop from 6.5 to 5.9.  
Audits yielded fewer violations in countries with greater per capita GDP (= -0.62; p = 
0.02; AME = -4.0) and in those with greater press freedom ( = -0.51; p = 0.02; AME = 3.3). 
Our point estimate indicates fewer violations at factories in countries with higher regulatory 
quality, but the relationship was not statistically significant ( = -0.18; p = 0.22).  
Robustness tests  
When we estimated the model using negative binomial regression instead of Poisson 
regression and when we used alternative measures of the audit team’s experience (mean instead 
of maximum tenure), training (average rather than maximum number of training courses), and 
age (the age of the oldest member rather than the average of the oldest and youngest members’ 
ages) and an alternative approach to controlling for the supplier’s audit sequence (a counter and 
its square instead of dummies), the results were nearly identical to our primary results. As 
described in the Appendix, instrumenting for the audit team’s maximum audit skills training and 
maximum tenure using average values of these characteristics among all auditors based in the 
auditing firm’s field office that staffed each establishment’s audits yielded statistically 
indistinguishable results (Hausman test  = 52.09; p = 0.16).  
We also estimated our primary model on various subsamples to assess the extent to which 
our results were driven by certain types of audits. Column 2 of Table 5 reports estimates after 
excluding the 210 audits performed for multinational firms whose audit teams were always all-
female, in case that pattern reflected a multinational firm’s policy that might bias our primary 
results. Column 3 reports estimates based on the 10,648 audits conducted by teams of at least 
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two members to ensure that our results were not driven by single-auditor audits. Column 4 
reports estimates of the model after excluding the 751 audits conducted according to third-party 
protocols, in case the influence of such protocols on the discovery or reporting of violations is 
not adequately controlled for with the dummy variable used in our main specification and 
because, in these cases, the factories themselves might have chosen the protocol and auditor. 
Column 5 reports results for the subsample of 9,266 audits that excludes each supplier’s first 
audit in our sample; some of those might have been pre-assessments of factories that 
multinational firms had not yet engaged and our hypothesized relationships might operate 
differently in such circumstances. Our results are quite robust across these subsamples. The sign 
and magnitude of all hypothesized variable coefficients are very similar to our main results.  
DISCUSSION 
Our research theorized and tested several social factors that shape how supply chain 
auditors identify and report violations of supplier codes of conduct. We find that auditors’ 
decisions are shaped not only by the financial conflicts of interest that have been the focus of 
research to date, but also by social factors, including the auditors’ experience, professional 
training, and gender; the gender diversity of their teams; and their repeated interactions with 
those whom they audit. These findings contribute to several literatures and suggest strategies for 
designing private monitoring regimes to provide companies with more reliable strategic 
information. 
Contributions to the strategic management literature 
Our study significantly extends the TCE literature’s conceptions of monitoring to address 
key strategic concerns associated with the global outsourcing of production.  First, we highlight 
the particular importance of supply chain monitoring to mitigate transaction costs that can arise 
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from negative reputational spillovers.  To our knowledge, the TCE literature has not explored 
this very substantial potential cost of outsourcing to suppliers with poor social or environmental 
practices.  In doing so, we bridge the TCE literature with strategic management perspectives on 
reputation (Roberts and Dowling, 2002).  Second, we add an important empirical dimension to 
the largely theoretical TCE literature on monitoring.  Our empirical documentation of 
heterogeneity in the quality of audit information suggests that any analyses of transaction costs 
mitigated by monitoring must consider not only the existence but the efficacy of different 
monitoring structures.  Third, we extend the literature’s focus on the ex ante design of 
monitoring structures to highlight the importance of ongoing, ex post monitoring in contractual 
relationships.  Finally, we identify important second-order monitoring problems that arise when 
firms outsource their monitoring functions to third-party auditors and our findings offer 
strategies firms can use to “monitor their monitors” and increase the reliability of the strategic 
information generated in supply chain audits.   
Contributions to auditing and gatekeeping research 
Although much is known about the adoption, diffusion, and outcomes of supply chain 
standards and codes of conduct that require auditing, the practices of the auditors themselves 
have largely remained a black box. We illuminate how auditing practices implemented on the 
ground—at the micro level—are influenced by several key auditor characteristics.  
 Prior literature exploring auditor bias has focused on economic incentives and conflicts 
of interest when those being audited are paying for the audits. Our analysis indicates that while 
economic incentives do play a role, private-sector auditor behavior is also significantly 
influenced by social institutions, identities, and relationships. Our finer-grained picture suggests 
that audit designers should moderate potential bias and increase audit reliability by considering 
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the auditors’ characteristics and relationships that we found significantly influence their 
decisions.  
Our findings should likewise inform the broader literature on private gatekeepers such as 
accountants and credit rating agencies, subjects of much interest since their failures to detect and 
reveal corporate wrongdoing led to corporate scandals and financial meltdowns in the early 
twenty-first century (Bratton, 2002; Partnoy, 2004). However, the gatekeeper literature, like the 
auditing literature, has focused almost exclusively on the influence of economic conflicts of 
interest (Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein, 1997; Cantor and Packer, 1994; Dallas, 2011; 
Goldberg, 1988; Hill, 2004; Manns, 2013; Moore et al., 2006; Oh, 2004; Partnoy, 2006; 
Schwarcz, 2002). Our study suggests the need to look at a broader range of factors in order to 
structure more effective gatekeeping regimes.  
Contributions to research on public-sector monitors  
By drawing on research on street-level bureaucracy in government regulatory agencies to 
predict the behavior of private-sector supply-chain auditors, our study initiates a needed dialogue 
between the literatures on public- and private-sector monitoring that until now have each missed 
important insights offered by the other. Calls for insight into the micro-level processes of private 
supply-chain auditing (Heras-Saizarbitoria and Boiral, 2013) have overlooked the extensive 
literature on street-level policy implementation by government monitors, while research on 
public-sector monitors has largely ignored front-line policy implementation by private-sector 
monitors who play an increasingly important role in regulating corporate conduct. Our study 
extends both literatures by elaborating micro-level implementation processes in the context of 
private-sector auditing. For example, while several studies of government monitors—including 
patent examiners (Lemley and Sampat, 2012) and U.S. Food and Drug Administration inspectors 
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of pharmaceutical plants (Macher, Mayo, and Nickerson, 2011)—have found an inverse 
relationship between experience and inspection stringency, we found that private monitors’ 
stringency increases as experience increases, although at a declining rate.  
Contributions to research on transnational business regulation  
Supply chain auditing has become an important component of international regulatory 
schemes that seek to address the social and environmental risks of global business activities 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Scott, 2012). Private labeling regimes such as the Forest 
Stewardship Council, the Marine Stewardship Council, and Fair Trade rely on private third-party 
auditors. International intergovernmental institutions such as the United Nations have 
encouraged supply chain auditing by requesting that MNCs conduct “due diligence” to ensure 
their suppliers’ compliance with international human rights norms (Kamatali, 2012; Ruggie, 
2008; Shamir, 2005). Many national regulators have followed suit, requiring MNCs to conduct 
due diligence and disclose supply chain practices (Zandvliet, 2011). The efficacy and legitimacy 
of private voluntary transnational business regulation largely depends on the credibility of 
monitoring; our study responds to calls for more empirical research on the key actors (Büthe, 
2010). While our findings of auditor heterogeneity support those who question auditor 
independence and objectivity (Boiral and Gendron, 2011; Power, 1997), our identification of 
several systematic determinants of that heterogeneity suggests how companies and policymakers 
can improve audit validity.  In addition, as governments begin to mandate certain ESG measures 
and disclosures that were once entirely private and voluntary, our findings suggests how firms 
can mitigate legal costs and risks associated with their practices in these domains. 
Implications for managers 
Our study provides tools to help firms manage their monitors to produce complete and 
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accurate information about suppliers that will enable them to make better strategic decisions 
about which suppliers to work with.  Our finding that auditors tend to cite fewer violations at 
factories where they have ongoing relationships empirically supports managers who advocate 
auditor rotation to deter capture (Moore et al., 2006; U.S. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, 2011). That auditors returning to the same supplier might consistently 
deemphasize some areas (and thus inadvertently overlook violations) should also encourage 
multinational firms to ensure that the auditors they hire engage in routine auditor rotation.10 Our 
findings also highlight the importance of companies ensuring that the teams that audit their 
suppliers are well trained. While auditors with higher educational credentials did not find 
significantly more supplier violations than less-educated peers, those with more audit-specific 
training did find significantly more supplier violations than those with less audit-specific 
training. Finally, our findings suggest that firms should ensure that the audit teams assessing 
their suppliers have sufficient experience and gender diversity. 
Limitations and future research  
Given the nature of our large quantitative study, we are unable to identify the precise 
mechanisms by which the factors we identify influence individual auditor decisions. We 
encourage future research to investigate the social processes underlying these outcomes.  
Our many discussions with social auditors, including employees of the firm that provided 
our data and employees of competing firms, yielded no reason to suspect that endogeneity 
concerns are driving our results. These discussions indicated that audit team assignments were 
driven largely by language skills, availability, and the need for each team to have a qualified lead 
auditor. Our discussions also indicated that multinational firms determine which factories are 
                                                 
10 A few auditing schemes have explicitly stipulated term limits for auditing companies; for example, California’s 
greenhouse gas regulation requires regulated entities to change verification companies every six years. 
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audited, which obviates the risk of a selection effect whereby better-than-average or worse-than-
average factories might choose to be audited or to pay for their own audits, as does happen in 
some voluntary environmental programs (King and Toffel, 2009). Even so, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that omitted variables are correlated with our independent variables and violation 
rates; we therefore encourage future randomized field experiments (e.g., Hainmueller, Hiscox, 
and Sequeira, 2011).  
Our findings relating to gender and gender diversity may be influenced by the gender 
composition of the supplier’s workforce. Although we do not have such demographic data, 
available meta-data and our own interviews with social auditors suggest that women dominate 
the workforce in export-intensive industries such as garments, textiles, and electronics, which 
account for most of our sample (Dejardin and Owens, 2009; Jenkins, Esquivel, and Larrían, 
2001; Kuncoro, 2011). Future research could explore how auditors’ decisions are influenced by 
the interaction of the gender compositions of the audit team and the audited organization.  
Future research can also explore how auditors’ decisions are influenced by various short- 
and long-term organizational structures and incentives. For instance, differing compensation 
systems may influence the extent to which supply chain auditors’ decisions are shaped by 
economic incentives and other factors. Field experiments might shed light on which types of 
technical and managerial training most improve auditors’ objectivity. More broadly, it will be 
important to investigate whether our findings are generalizable to different types of private 
gatekeepers, such as financial auditors, credit ratings agencies, and attorneys. Do they respond 
similarly to economic incentives, professional obligations, and social pressures? In addition, 
direct comparisons of the implementation practices of private-sector monitors such as social 
auditors and public-sector monitors such as government inspectors could reveal opportunities to 
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enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of both.  Finally, from the TCE perspective, it is 
important to investigate whether social monitoring actually mitigates reputational transaction 
costs for outsourcing firms, either by improving the social practices of suppliers or by providing 
firms with timely actionable information about reputational risks in their supply chains.  
CONCLUSION 
Although private supply chain auditors are increasingly important to strategic corporate 
outsourcing decisions and to public and private transnational business regulation, they have 
seldom attracted academic attention. Our investigation of supply chain auditing practices at 
thousands of factories around the world reveals several social factors that influence auditors’ 
decisions. More broadly, our work contributes to literatures on strategic management, private 
supply chain monitoring, and regulatory compliance mechanisms and highlights opportunities to 
improve the design and implementation of monitoring outsourced production. 
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Appendix. Endogeneity Assessment 
Our interviews with the social auditing firm that provided our data consistently indicated that 
auditors were assigned to audit teams according to three criteria: (1) their language skills, to 
ensure they could communicate with the audited supplier’s managers and workers; (2) their 
availability, given their other auditing assignments; and (3) the need for at least one team 
member to qualify as a lead auditor. We conducted several empirical tests to assess whether lead 
auditors and non-lead auditors differed along dimensions that we hypothesized would affect the 
discovery and reporting of violations and found some evidence that they did: 
 
 Graduate education. The distribution of educational attainment does not significantly differ 
between lead auditors and non-lead auditors, as indicated by a Pearson chi-squared test (2 = 
4.2, p = 0.24) of an ordinal educational attainment variable coded 1 for high school, 2 for 
associate degree, 3 for bachelor’s degree, and 4 for graduate degree. 
 
 Gender. Lead auditors are no more likely than non-lead auditors to be a particular gender. 
Males make up 37% of the firm’s lead auditors and 33% of its non-lead auditors, a non-
significant difference according to a test-of-proportions analysis (z = -1.06, p = 0.29).  
 
 Tenure. The average tenure of lead auditors is 4.4 years of service—significantly more than 
the 2.3 average for non-lead auditors (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -10.1, p < 0.01).   
 
 Audit skills training. Lead auditors averaged 5.5 audit skills training sessions—significantly 
more than the non-lead auditors’ average of 2.6 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -9.3, p < 0.01).  
 
The latter two results imply that larger audit teams would tend to have lower average tenure and 
lower average audit team skills training because the higher values for the lead auditors would be 
increasingly “diluted” by additional non-lead-auditor team members.  However, in our analysis, 
we measure audit team tenure and audit skills training based on each team’s maximum values, 
which do not suffer this “dilution” problem. (Furthermore, our model specification includes a 
series of dummies to control for audit team size.) These factors isolate our analysis from 
differences between lead and non-lead auditors, since all audit teams need one lead auditor.  
 
We nonetheless conducted additional analyses to investigate whether endogeneity bias might 
affect our primary results. Given the differences in audit skills training and tenure between lead 
and non-lead auditors, we explored whether the estimated coefficients on our other hypothesized 
variables were substantially altered if we omitted those two variables from our model. The 
results of the more parsimonious model (reported in Column 2 of Table A-1) do not differ 
substantially from our primary results (reproduced in Column 1 of Table A-1). In particular, the 
coefficient magnitudes and statistical significance of the other hypothesized variables (previous 
auditor, graduate education, all-female audit team, and mixed-gender audit team) are 
remarkably stable across these two models. This indicates that irrespective of potential 
endogeneity concerns associated with audit skills training and maximum tenure, we find no 
evidence to suggest that such concerns spill over to the inferences associated with our other 
hypotheses (that is, H1, H3 when professionalism is measured by education, H4, and H5).  
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Our primary model is vulnerable to the possibility that endogeneity would bias our estimates on 
maximum tenure risk and maximum audit skills training if the auditing firm deployed teams 
whose members had higher maximum values of audit skills training and/or maximum tenure to 
particular types of establishment that varied in ways that were unobservable but would influence 
violations. One possible scenario is if the auditing firm assigned more highly skilled or 
experienced lead auditors to “bad apples”—that is, establishments suspected of being 
egregiously unconcerned with working conditions. Those lead auditors might be better able to 
ascertain information from managers and workers at such establishments, which are likely to 
have many violations. But the reverse might also be true: the auditing firm might send less-
trained and less-skilled lead auditors to establishments suspected of having very safe working 
conditions; since such establishments would be expected to have few if any violations, less 
expertise would be required to audit them adequately. If these stories are true in our empirical 
context, we would expect to see much less variation in audit skills training and maximum tenure 
within the teams auditing the same establishment than between the teams auditing different 
establishments. In fact, we do not see such a pattern in our data when we decompose variation 
into within- and between-establishment components.  For audit skills training, the within-
establishment standard deviation (SDw) is calculated based on all audit-level audit skills training 
values after de-meaning them at the establishment level and adding back the grand mean (that is, 
xit - xi + xi). The between-establishment standard deviation (SDb) is calculated based on 
establishment-level averages (that is, xi). For audit skills training, the between-establishment 
variation (SDb = 1.32) is very similar to the within-establishment variation (SDw = 1.21). That is, 
the variation in audit skills training among audit teams for two randomly drawn establishments is 
nearly identical to the variation in audit skills training among the audit teams of two randomly 
selected audits of the same establishment. The same is true for maximum tenure: the between-
establishment variation (SDb = 1.51) is very similar to the within-establishment variation (SDw = 
1.44). These results fail to support the notion that establishments tend to be consistently assigned 
teams with any particular average audit skills training or maximum tenure.   
 
Establishments whose audit teams have the highest or lowest average audit skills training in our 
sample might be the most vulnerable to endogeneity, as they might represent the worst of the 
“bad apples” or the best of the “good apples.” We therefore reestimated our primary model on a 
subsample that excluded these outlier establishments whose audit teams’ average levels of audit 
skills training fell below the 1st percentile or exceeded the 99th percentile. Similarly, we also 
estimated our model on a subsample that excluded establishments whose audit teams’ average 
levels of maximum tenure fell below the 1st percentile or exceeded the 99th percentile. The 
results of these models, reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table A-1, are nearly identical to the 
results of our primary model estimated on the full sample (Column 1). These results provide no 
evidence that endogeneity is driving our primary results. 
 
Another approach to investigating whether endogeneity might be biasing our primary results is to 
instrument for the audit team’s maximum audit skills training and maximum tenure. We used 
average values of these characteristics among all auditors based in the auditing firm’s field office 
that staffed each establishment’s audits, an approach based on (a) Card’s (1995) instrumenting an 
individual’s propensity to attend college using the distance between that individual’s domicile 
and the nearest college and (b) Forman, Goldfarb, and Greenstein’s (2012) instrumenting a 
firm’s propensity to adopt Internet technology using the propensity of nearby firms. Because 
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these office averages vary little over time, the primary form of variation is cross-sectional (that 
is, between offices). We instrument for auditing skills training, maximum tenure, and maximum 
tenure squared—and also, to be as thorough as possible, certification training—by including the 
office-level corollaries to these variables using the audit year’s values at each audited 
establishments’ audit field office. The validity of our instruments requires that office-level 
averages of audit skills training and tenure: (1) be correlated with audit teams’ audit skills 
training and tenure (instrument relevance) and (2) be assumed not to have any direct influence on 
factories’ violation rates (instrument exogeneity).  The first requirement is confirmed by 
observing that the specific audit-team-level and field-office-level variables are correlated at 0.77 
for audit skills training, 0.58 for tenure, and 0.51 for certification training. The second condition 
relies on an assumption that field office demographics (our instrument) should not have a direct 
influence on audit results, but instead exert influence only via the demographics of the team 
members drawn from the office.  
 
We sought to estimate this instrumental variables model using Poisson regression with 
endogenous regressors, but the matrix size created based on the 16,795 establishment-level fixed 
effects made this infeasible.  As a second-best solution, we compared the results of our primary 
model estimated using fixed-effects OLS regression on the log number of violations (plus one to 
avoid losing cases with zero violations)—that is, assuming all variables were exogenous—to the 
results of a fixed-effects instrumental-variables OLS regression model on the logged number of 
violations (plus one). We used the log of the count as the dependent variable in these two models 
to make their specifications more comparable to those of our primary Poisson regression 
approach, which assumes that the logarithm of the violation count can be modeled by a linear 
combination of the independent variables. A Hausman test failed to reject the null, which is that 
the difference between the coefficients from the IV and OLS approaches is not systematic ( = 
52.09, p = 0.16). This implies that the IV approach in the continuous-dependent-variable context 
does not significantly alter the results, which provides no evidence suggesting that one cannot 
rely on the more straightforward modeling approach that assumes that the independent variables 
are exogenous. Given that (a) the OLS on the logged number of violations and (b) the Poisson 
model on the number of violations are each modeling the logged counts of violations, we infer 
that the IV Poisson model would not yield results systematically different from those of our 
primary fixed-effect Poisson model. 
 
In sum, several alternative investigative approaches yield no evidence that endogeneity is biasing 




Table A-1. Regression results 
 
Dependent variable: Number of violations 
 
See notes for model definitions (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Prior inspector  -0.042* -0.039* -0.040* -0.043* -0.044* -0.034* 
[0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.017] 
Maximum tenure 0.065**  0.065** 0.073** 0.061** 0.049**
[0.014]  [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.012] 
Maximum tenure, squared -0.004**  -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.003**
[0.001]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Graduate education 0.028 0.027 0.012 0.027 0.026 -0.001 
[0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.025] [0.022] 
Auditing skills training 0.020**  0.020** 0.019** 0.018** 0.024**
[0.007]  [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] 
All-female audit team 0.054** 0.057** 0.050** 0.052** 0.054** 0.041**
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.014] 
Mixed-gender audit team 0.067** 0.075** 0.068** 0.065** 0.065** 0.064**
[0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.019] 
Average age -0.026 -0.011 -0.026 -0.027 -0.031+ -0.022 
[0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] 
Average age, squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.000 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Certification training -0.024 0.021 -0.024 -0.026 -0.017 -0.030+ 
[0.020] [0.018] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.018] 
Third-party protocol -0.081 -0.084 -0.089 -0.077 -0.086 -0.112* 
[0.058] [0.058] [0.059] [0.059] [0.062] [0.056] 
Unannounced audit 0.029 0.028 0.034 0.025 0.025 0.057**
[0.020] [0.020] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.018] 
Audit paid for by supplier or agent  -0.084** -0.085** -0.087** -0.085** -0.087** -0.063* 
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.025] 
Re-audit -0.348** -0.348** -0.341** -0.349** -0.358** -0.297**
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.014] 
Per-capita GDP (log) -0.631* -0.678** -0.747** -0.675* -0.653* -0.761**
[0.262] [0.262] [0.265] [0.264] [0.263] [0.243] 
Regulatory quality -0.177 -0.185 -0.262+ -0.163 -0.191 -0.221 
[0.150] [0.150] [0.157] [0.151] [0.152] [0.141] 
Press freedom -0.511* -0.530* -0.532* -0.576* -0.559* -0.464* 
[0.224] [0.223] [0.232] [0.227] [0.224] [0.212] 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of auditors FE (2 to 5+) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audit-sequence dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Client-country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Audits (N) 16,795 16,795 15,698 16,496 16,200 15,209 
Firms 5,819 5,819 5,328 5,693 5,551 5,321 
 
All results are from Poisson regression.  
Brackets contain standard errors clustered by supplier; ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10. 
Column 1 reports estimates of the primary model (reproduced from Table 5, Column 1). 
Column 2 reports estimates of a model that omits maximum tenure and auditing skills training.  
Column 3 reports estimates on the subsample that excludes audited factories whose audit teams’ average auditing 
skills training falls below the 1st percentile or exceeds the 99th percentile of the sample distribution. 
Column 4 reports estimates on the subsample that excludes audited factories whose audit teams’ average maximum 
tenure falls below the 1st percentile or exceeds the 99th percentile of the sample distribution. 
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Table 1. Geographic composition of supplier locations 
 
Audits Factories 
Number Percent Number Percent 
Africa 100 1% 38 1%
Americas 1,509 9% 522 9%
  United States 949 285 
  Mexico 172 75 
  Brazil 84 37 
  Elsewhere in Americas 304 125 
Asia and Australia 14,773 88% 5,084 87%
  China (incl. Macao and Hong Kong) 11,746 3,917 
  India 708 277 
  Vietnam 424 153 
  Indonesia 377 137 
  Bangladesh 321 140 
  Philippines 270 96 
  Pakistan 184 71 
  Sri Lanka 159 61 
  Taiwan 131 56 
  Korea 120 49 
  Elsewhere in Asia & Australia 333 127 
Europe 413 2% 175 3%
  Turkey 186 72 
  Italy 88 42 
  Elsewhere in Europe 139 61 
Total 16,795 100% 5,819 100%
 
Table 2. Industry composition 
 
Industry Audits  Factories 
 Number Percent Number Percent 
Accessories 1,740 10% 579 10% 
Building materials 260 2% 84 1% 
Chemicals and plastics 97 1% 42 1% 
Electronics 590 4% 184 3% 
Food, agriculture, beverage 138 1% 58 1% 
Footwear 356 2% 122 2% 
Furniture 383 2% 123 2% 
Garments 6,188 37% 2,113 36% 
Metal products 156 1% 51 1% 
Paper, printing, publishing 183 1% 63 1% 
Services 50 0% 19 0% 
Toys 463 3% 150 3% 
Other/unknown 6,191 37% 2,231 38% 
Total 16,795 100% 5,819 100% 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Number of violations 6.49 5.61 0 75 
Previous auditor 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Maximum tenure 5.39 2.03 1 15 
Average tenure 4.86 1.85 0.5 15 
Graduate education 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Auditing skills training 2.25 1.74 0 12 
All-male audit team 0.33 0.47 0 1 
All-female audit team 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Mixed-gender audit team 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Certification training 0.50 0.42 0 1 
Brand training 0.59 0.43 0 1 
Average age 30.12 4.47 22.5 59 
Maximum age 30.62 4.66 25 59 
Third-party protocol 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Unannounced audit 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Audit paid for by supplier or agent 0.56 0.50 0 1 
Audit paid for by multinational firm  0.44 0.50 0 1 
Re-audit 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Number of auditors 1.79 0.58 1 5 
Audit sequence 2.96 2.25 1 21 
Per-capita GDP (log) 7.77 0.98 5.61 10.68 
Regulatory quality -0.04 0.54 -1.64 1.99 
Press freedom 0.33 0.27 0.12 1.00 
Note: N =16,795 audits except N =15,812 for audit paid for by supplier or agent and audit paid for by 
multinational firm, N =11,337 for average age and maximum age, and N =16,676 for press freedom.
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Table 4. Pairwise correlations 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
(1) Number of violations 1.00                      
(2) Previous auditor -0.13 1.00                     
(3) Maximum tenure -0.01 0.03 1.00                    
(4) Average tenure -0.03 0.03 0.92 1.00                   
(5) Graduate education -0.07 0.09 -0.04 -0.04 1.00                  
(6) Auditing skills training -0.03 0.05 -0.20 -0.30 -0.04 1.00                 
(7) All-male audit team -0.07 0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.07 -0.07 1.00                
(8) All-female audit team 0.05 -0.09 0.03 0.07 -0.14 0.01 -0.70 1.00               
(9) Mixed-gender audit team 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.32 -0.45 1.00              
(10) Certification training 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.12 -0.04 0.47 0.04 0.03 -0.09 1.00             
(11) Brand training -0.02 0.06 -0.15 -0.16 -0.09 0.59 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.45 1.00            
(12) Average age -0.10 0.16 0.43 0.49 0.18 -0.17 0.22 -0.22 0.02 0.08 -0.12 1.00           
(13) Maximum age -0.08 0.16 0.43 0.45 0.19 -0.12 0.19 -0.23 0.07 0.07 -0.12 0.97 1.00          
(14) Third-party protocol 0.12 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.00         
(15) Unannounced audit 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.09 1.00        
(16) Audit paid for by supplier or agent 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.14 -0.20 1.00       
(17) Audit paid for by multinational firm -0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.20 -1.00 1.00      
(18) Re-audit -0.12 0.12 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.05 -0.05 1.00     
(19) Number of auditors 0.13 -0.05 -0.06 -0.27 0.01 0.04 -0.23 -0.05 0.36 -0.27 -0.18 -0.29 -0.21 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.05 1.00    
(20) Audit sequence -0.28 0.15 -0.14 -0.20 -0.03 0.31 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.09 0.20 -0.11 -0.09 -0.07 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.02 1.00   
(21) Per-capita GDP (log) -0.18 0.08 0.22 0.20 -0.05 0.21 -0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.09 0.14 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 0.12 -0.16 0.16 -0.09 -0.13 0.14 1.00  
(22) Regulatory quality -0.19 0.10 0.22 0.21 0.01 0.14 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.09 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.13 -0.18 0.18 -0.11 -0.15 0.11 0.95 1.00 
(23) Press freedom -0.27 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.34 -0.05 0.15 -0.14 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.46 0.42 0.00 0.12 -0.24 0.24 -0.14 -0.28 0.02 0.54 0.65 
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Table 5. Regression results 
Dependent variable: Number of violations 







Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
H1 Previous auditor -0.043* -0.28 -0.039+ -0.028 -0.044* -0.027 
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.026] [0.021] [0.025] 
H2 Maximum tenure 0.065** 0.12 0.068** 0.078** 0.069** 0.084**
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.016] [0.014] [0.017] 
H2 Maximum tenure, squared -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** -0.005** -0.005**
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
H3 Graduate education 0.027 0.18 0.030 -0.004 0.021 0.045 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.029] [0.026] [0.039] 
H3 Auditing skills training 0.021** 0.14 0.022** 0.013 0.022** 0.012 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.007] [0.009] 
H4 All-female audit team 0.054** 0.35 0.055** 0.048* 0.053** 0.052* 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.019] [0.016] [0.021] 
H5 Mixed-gender audit team 0.067** 0.43 0.068** 0.049* 0.069** 0.067* 
 [0.021] [0.021] [0.024] [0.021] [0.028] 
 Certification training -0.021 -0.14 -0.024 -0.027 -0.031 -0.010 
 [0.021] [0.021] [0.027] [0.021] [0.029] 
 Brand training -0.014 -0.09 -0.012 0.008 -0.007 0.001 
 [0.021] [0.022] [0.026] [0.022] [0.030] 
 Average age -0.025 -0.04 -0.026 -0.015 -0.023 -0.041 
 [0.019] [0.020] [0.028] [0.019] [0.027] 
 Average age, squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
 Third-party protocol -0.080 -0.52 -0.088 -0.148* -0.210* 
 [0.058] [0.062] [0.070] [0.101] 
 Unannounced audit 0.029 0.19 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.075**
 [0.020] [0.020] [0.025] [0.020] [0.027] 
 Audit paid for by supplier or agent -0.084** -0.55 -0.083** -0.068* -0.064* -0.099**
 [0.026] [0.027] [0.032] [0.028] [0.034] 
 Re-audit -0.348** -2.26 -0.351** -0.353** -0.358** -0.345**
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.019] [0.017] [0.020] 
 Per-capita GDP (log) -0.623* -4.04 -0.551* -0.749 -0.714** -0.210 
 [0.262] [0.264] [0.473] [0.267] [0.389] 
 Regulatory quality -0.180 -1.17 -0.169 -0.385 -0.158 -0.621**
 [0.150] [0.150] [0.298] [0.153] [0.231] 
 Press freedom  -0.510* -3.31 -0.531* -1.059* -0.402+ -0.879**
 [0.224] [0.224] [0.476] [0.239] [0.339] 
 Observations (audits) 16,795 16,585 10,648 16,044 9,266 
 Factories 5,819 5,748 3,810 5,523 3,082 
Standard errors clustered by supplier (factory); ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.10. All models also include fixed 
effects for the audited establishment, audit year, multinational firm country, number of auditors (2 through 5 or 
more), and the supplier’s audit sequence (2nd through 6th or more). All models include three dummy variables to 
indicate instances in which the following variables were missing data and thus recoded to 0: average age and 
maximum age (5,458 audits), audit paid for by supplier or agent and audit paid for by multinational firm (983 
audits), and press freedom (119 audits). Model 1 is the primary model estimated on the entire sample. Model 2 
excludes audits conducted for multinational firms whose audit teams were always all-female. Model 3 includes only 
audits conducted by at least two auditors. Model 4 excludes audits conducted according to a third-party protocol. 
Model 5 excludes factories’ first audit during the sample period. 
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 Audit team’s maximum tenure 
 
Note: The figure depicts average predicted number of violations from the fixed-effects Poisson 
model estimated in Column 1 of Table 5, spanning the 5th to 95th percentiles of audit tenure. 
Dashed lines represent the 95-percent confidence interval. 
 
 




 Supplier’s audit sequence 
 
Note: The figure depicts sample averages, with dashed lines representing 95-percent confidence 
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